Konspirative Wohnungen // Conspiracy Dwellings


Conspirative sympathies, ambiguous securities
by Gijs van Oenen

versie 30 augustus 2007
3000 woorden

Move through any large square, railway station, shopping mall, or other 'public place' in any metropolitan area today, and you will be 'monitored' by scores of security camera's. For good measure, all your email traffic, internet search terms, and mobile phone records are being stored, for at least one and a half year. And although the European Union purported to do away with borders and passport controls, we are now more than ever before being asked to identify ourselves, and even required to carry ID cards. This is the tragic and paradoxical result of the recent obsession with security. Increasingly we feel threatened, although we are not exactly sure by what. And we certainly feel ambiguous about who should protect us from these threats or relieve us from our insecurities.

In this contribution, I want to discuss the present obsession with security from two specific perspectives. Firstly, from the context of the changing relation between citizens and their government since the 1960s, and secondly, from the split but complementary perspectives of (formerly) Eastern and Western Europe.

Put very succinctly, our political and social orientation has transformed since the 1960s from a 'management by command' to a 'management by negotiation' (De Swaan 1979). While deferential citizens simply followed norms imposed on them by external authorities, modern emancipated citizens only accept norms that they themselves have interactively subscribed to. More or less simultaneously, society's self-understanding changed from one of 'makeability' and of collective support for the welfare state, to one of 'security' and of liberal, individual self-sustenance. Trust and confidence in government suffered as a result, and a very ambiguous attitude towards government arose. Modern citizens expect much from government in the sense of protection and security, yet accept very little from it in the way of criticism, exhortation, or admonition.

Obviously, this process has not occurred in the same way and along the same lines in eastern, communist-dominated countries as it has in capitalist, western-european countries. But it has not been completely different either. In a sense, both have gone through the same transition, only societies like the former DDR have done so in a much rougher, abrupter, and more confusing way. They were thrown straight from a radical, totalitarian view on makeability into an equally radical, but very different liberal view on how to monitor and control a society of rights-claiming individualists.

Strangely, in this process the concept of 'conspiracy dwellings' has changed places, so to speak, between the eastern and the western preoccupations with makeability and security. Under the eastern, communist regime conspiracy dwellings were necessary to (en)force the makeability of society. The (eastern) German Volk was supposed to be more than pleased with their Volkseigen system of governance, but somehow the authorities deemed conspiracy dwellings proper 'gateways' to remind the Volk of its own enthusiasm. In contemporary western society, new forms of conspiracy dwellings are established to similarly remind citizens about their own enthusiasm for the system of 'private wealth, public poverty'. The rampant liberty espoused by liberal individualism increasingly requires mechanisms of surveillance and control that - hopefully - provide liberal societies with the ever more scarce good of security.

Although the eastern and western kind of conspirary dwellings differ, of course, in many ways, they share the same troublesome characteristic of restricting and invading liberties in the name of liberty itself. They perform the contradictory task of perversly transforming open spaces within the heart of society itself into surveillance regimes that secretly, and often illegally, mock the very same freedoms they profess to defend.

To explain this uncanny convergence of former eastern and latter western ways of destroying freedom in order to protect it, let me first address the issue of how the notion of security changed meaning in western countries, such as the Netherlands, in the last few decennia of the twentieth century. A simple library catalogue search on how the concept of security has been applied throughout the twentieth century reveals a surprising turn of meaning. Up until the eighties, the notion of security almost exclusively referred to one issue, and one issue only: the fear for nuclear fall-out, from either atomic bombs or nuclear reactors. Concern for security thus seemed a reaction to an external threat, a threat outside one's own control. But somewhere in the middle eighties, a quite dramatic change in usage occurred. Suddenly, the concept became linked not to external threats, but to internal societal processes that were perceived to endanger society: crime, but more particularly all kinds of economic, social and technological 'risks' - dangers that are unleashed by the technological and productive powers of late modern society itself, and in that sense have become 'commonplace'. As sociologist Ulrich Beck put it concisely in his famous book Risikogesellschaft, published in 1986: 'Gefahren werden zu blinden Passagieren des Normalkonsums' (Beck 1986, 10)

How to explain this sudden inversion of meaning? On the one hand, the eighties saw the end of the cold war, diminishing the fear of an atomic Armageddon. And on the other hand, in many western European countries the eighties also brought the demise of social-democratic visions of the makeable society, and the concomitant rise of neo-liberalism. 'Soft' ideas on prevention of crime and rehabilitation of criminals were replaced by harsher sentencing, individualism was promoted, and government downsized. Instead of something to be shaped in accordance with insights from charismatic leaders or collective deliberation, society became something to be monitored and policed; both government and society became entities to be distrusted. Society was now seen as something 'foreign', full of 'risks'; although government should stay 'off people's backs', it was simultaneously charged with the responsibility to protect the same people against the diffuse mass of risks that society itself now seemed to imply, or even produce, as Ulrich Beck argued.

In eastern European countries such as the DDR before the 'Wende', the notion of security of course had a much different ring, as exemplified by the onerous bureau for Staatssicherheit, the Stasi. In the DDR, the concept of Konspirative Wohnungen turned common locations in the public sphere of civil society into spaces of control - such as Zum guldenen Stern, the oldest house in the city of Erfurt. Threats supposedly inherent in society were to be monitored, controled, and neutralized from within society. Even stronger, threats considered to be inherent in the realms of freedom created by civil socity were to be contained by invading and perverting those same realms. The Erfurt building, ironically, once housed one of the first Gutenberg printing presses [Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26/6/06, p.3]. Provoking society by deliberately disabusing its spaces of freedom for curtailing that freedom entails a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy - such provocation will indeed produce 'dissidence', which can then be tracked down and stifled.

In an ironic reversal, similarly self-fulfilling - or self-defeating - tactics were used by the Rote Armee Fraktion in the 1970s to fight what they considered to be a repressive state apparatus. By provoking the state through acts of violence, they hoped to 'tear off its mask of tolerance' in order to 'unveil its real face' of oppression, totalitarianism even. In a further irony, dwellings rented by the RAF for purposes of conspiracy were called 'Konspirative Wohnungen', while in the DDR it referred to Stasi-rented houses. Anyway, the same self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism was at work as in the DDR. While western european states such as the BRD in the 1970s, although far from ideal, certainly were not totalitarian, through violently provocation they could possibly be turned into something resembling a totalitarian power, thus creating the monster the provokers claimed to oppose in the first place.

An in one more ironic reversal, what the purport of security was in the East before the Wende, was embraced by western societies afterwards: exercising control over a distrusted society full of potentially unruly subjects. While earlier, western european countries embraced the ideal of makeability and rightly rejecting totalitarian methods to pursue it, the triumph of neoliberalism in the eighties seems to have entailed a form of control that, although not totalitarian, is based on a comparable kind of neoliberal distrust of society by government, and of government by society.

Although western european states cannot be called totalitarian, neither before nor after the turn towards neoliberal values, they can plausibly be said to embrace mechanisms and practices of monitoring and surveillance that do invade public spaces of freedom and reshape them into spaces of control, thus in a way imitating the strategy of 'occupation' used by their earlier eastern european counterparts, albeit by different means and within a formal framework of a liberal rule of law. They equally find it necessary to keep tabs on their citizens, to monitor and register their movements, to store such information in extensive, interlinked databases, all in an attempt to provide, or apply, 'security'.

This technologically mediated style of control is mostly beyond the need for literal, physical conspiracy dwellings, such as those in Erfurt. In as far as it needs physical shape and shelter, it is housed in very small, inconspicuous units, such as surveillance camera's, mobile phones, and RFID-chips. Still, these forms of control resemble conspiracy dwellings in as much as they invade public space from within, intruding into the space of people's public lifes, ready to register their movements, meetings, conversations, and expressions. In disguise, they take part in our daily public life, dwelling among us without identifying themselves or revealing the true extent of their presence. They may not always be used to the full extent of their capabilities, but their panoptic potential is beyond doubt.

Whence the rise of these new kind of 'conspiracy dwellings', more technological and less totalitarian than the traditional kind, but similarly intruding civil society in the name of freedom and security? Partly, one might argue, this is simply an effect of technological development. Mobile phones and RFID-chips become available, and people buy them. For another part, it may be said that new forms of 'biopolitics' are being developed, that go under the name of 'governance', or 'governmentality' (cf Bröckling a.o. 2000). Yet it seems to me that the new 'conspirative tendencies' are to be understood in the context of a larger transformation of social and cultural life, one that I would like to characterize as a shift from interactivity to interpassivity.

The term interpassivity was coined in the philosophy of art by philosophers Robert Pfaller (2000) and Slavoj Zizek (1997). In interactive art installations, they argued, the work of art can only realize itself through participation of the public. The work of art, like modern man, becomes what it is through interaction, as 'an equal partner in dialogue'. Modern man equally experiences interactivity as an indispensable condition. Being emancipated and able to speak for himself, he claims the right to be involved in the establishment and validation of social norms. Or in other words, to have one's say in the democratic organisation of public life.

In the classic philosophical view, as espoused by Immanuel Kant and imaginatively developed later by e.g. Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, publicity indicates the ability of emancipated persons to act according to norms and reasons that can be shared with others. They do not need external authority to create a selfregulating public space in which people with very different lifestyles, convictions, and practices can tolerate, or perhaps even value, each other's opinions, actions, and challenges. Public confrontation, it was thought, produces better citizens. We could describe this ideal as something like an interactive kingdom.

The condition of interpassivity, however, indicates that the work of art - or in the political context that of public life - no longer stands in need of our involvement. It is now able to realize itself without our participation, and thus beyond interaction. Although visitors (in art) and citizens (in politics) may still feel very much connected to the work of art, or the process of politics, their input is no longer indispensable. The political system preempts our views, preferences, and objections. Confronted with the 'anticipating verification of our behaviour', as the philosopher Jean Baudrillard called it, our participation has become redundant. No longer characterized by a 'transcendent mythical sociality', public life has now become a 'pathetic sociality of nearness, (...) of reassurance' (1983, 127). Our presence has become something of a 'standing by', something circumstantial rather than essential.

As a parallel development in the socio-political sphere, the selfregulation based on an interactive self-understanding as a self-governing person no longer seems to hold in contemporary, neoliberal society. Although people still value their status as interactive, self-determining individuals, they increasingly seem unable to act in accordance with norms that they themselves, interactively, subscribe to. They seem defiant, disinterested, careless, absentminded, self-willed, and in many other ways temporarily indisposed to be proud subjects of an interactive kingdom.

This transition deeply affects the nature and the organisation of public space in contemporary life. Public space is no longer entrusted with the capacity for self-regulation; its inhabitants no longer see the presence of others as something that is valuable in itself, as something constitutive of a free, nontotalitarian way of life. The value of, and the responsibility for, a viable public sphere are disowned, in the double sense of being shifted away, and being outsourced. In interpassive style, it is 'the system' that is being charged with the responsibility for the proper functioning of public life and the proper organisation of public space; and conversely, the system is indeed eager to take this upon itself.

By outsourcing the responsibility for the public sphere, we take the decisive step from 'interactive kingdom' to what we might call an 'interpassive republic'. Security, it seems, is the negative sociability we are left with once we have decided to outsource our interest and our responsibility as citizens for maintaining an interactive kingdom. The moment we declare ourselves uncapable to act on the very norms that constitute and symbolize a realm of public freedom - norms that we once assented to for exactly that reason - we forfeit the right and the ability to create our own public life-world. We disown makeability and empower 'security', that encompassing obsession with the question whom we can trust when we can no longer trust ourselves.

Sad to say, that is what security nowadays basically means. If we no longer feel able to act in accordance with norms that we ourselves have instituted and validated, who or what can we appeal to for the regulation of our public life? Although at times we are visited by bouts of nostalgia, we must realize that we cannot go back to an age when we still enjoyed a secure life. First, because there is nothing to go back to. 'Back then', we had no principles or mechanisms to arrange and implement security, because there was no problem of 'security' to be mastered, and dealt with. The security problem is something we ourselves brought into the world, as a Faustian figment of our imagination, and now we're stuck with it. Second, because the experience in Eastern European countries such as the DDR abundantly shows us that political regimes powerful enough to really deal with the issue of 'security' are, exactly for that reason, not what we want.

The course we now seem to have embarked on, as a - belated - 'third way', is that of surveillance, or panopticism without central control. Or in yet another figure, one of conspiracy dwellings without the Stasi. Although strictly speaking conspiracies are a form of totalitarian paranoia - they can exist, or be presumed to exist, only when there is totalitarian control fearful of being conspired against - the obsession with security creates, in reverse mode, its own mirage of an unkown dark force threatening society. A conspiracy, from this perspective, is an unknown activity of unknown citizens possibly directed against the state. And in contemporary liberal risk society, such conspiracies dwell almost everywhere. One might say neoliberal society does not need a concrete, external enemy to feel insecure; it has its own internal, individualistic and interpassive dynamics to make it feel permanently under threat. That is why one can say, with e.g. Baudrillard, that terrorists do little more than ignite the fuse of explosives that western, neoliberal societies have planted themselves.

This goes to explain why there is almost no end to the measures and activities that are nowadays considered necessary to strengthen security. Because in risk society, 'insecurities' and dangers lurk everywhere, it has all too many fuses to be lit by terrorists. The slogan used in the official Dutch government media campaign to promote awareness on security issues unwittingly illustrates this point: ''Two hundred thousand professionals are working together every day to minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack". The staggering number of two hundred thousand - which includes railway station cleaners, and other kinds of menial professions now deemed to harbor a security dimension - almost intentionally evokes the memory of the hundreds of thousands of people employed by the DDR to 'maximize security'. And similarly, the conspirators are among us, making it necessary to extend the security measures deep into the fabric of civil society. For instance, by requiring everyone to carry official proofs of identity - when there is not even a hint as to how this might increase security. But also by giving far-reaching powers to police and prosecutors, abridging civil rights, and extending criminal procedures to include cases of 'conspiracy', and mere 'prefatory' actions that might lead up to crimes.

Precisely this confluence of omnipresent possible terrorist activity with the equally omnipresent state activity to 'secure' society makes that 'conspiracy dwellings' may be said to exist not only in the former DDR, but also in present neoliberal society. It is not just that some citizens conspire against the state, or that the state itself conspires against its citizens. Conspiracy dwellings come into being when and where forces from civil society and forces from the state actively seek engagement with what they, from their respective points of view, both consider to be societal threats. It is their mutual distrustful activies that create the object they both pursue in their meeting places called conspiracy dwellings: the abject object of 'security'.

Literature

Jean Baudrillard, Les stratégies fatales. Bernard Grasset, Paris 1983
Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1986
Ulrich Bröckling a.o. (eds.), Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 2000
Robert Pfaller, Interpassivität. Studien über delegiertes Genießen. Springer verlag, Wien & New York 2000
Bram de Swaan, Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaansangst: over de verschuiving van bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding. Amsterdam, Meulenhoff 1979
Slavoj Zizek, The plague of fantasies, Verso, London 1997


Bio

Gijs van Oenen (1959) is senior lecturer in philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has also been affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, Webster University Leiden, and the Rotterdam Academy of Architecture and Urban Design. Currently he directs a research project at Erasmus University on 'interpassive metal fatigue', inquiring why people increasingly seem unable to act on norms they themselves affirm.